In this article, I argue that the traditional model of spare parts logistics \u2013 forecasting, overstocking, global transport, long lead times \u2013 is fundamentally unsustainable and increasingly unnecessary. AM is going to offer a better alternative for a an increasingly large share of parts, especially slow-moving and late-life-cycle parts. Adoption will be uneven, and not without challenges, but the direction is clear. Organizations that fail to adapt will find themselves maintaining complex systems to solve problems that no longer exist. These organizations will have about twenty years to continue with business as usual before they realize they missed the train.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Introduction<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Revolutions in logistics are rare. Unlike the fast-paced innovation cycles we see in digital industries, logistics tends to evolve slowly and often conservatively. Arguably, in intralogistics the most consequential development in the past century was not a technological breakthrough, but a shift in mindset: the introduction of Lean philosophy by Toyota. The realization that waste could (and should) be systematically eliminated from material flow, and what constitutes waste in the first place, had more lasting impact than any single piece of automation. I will come back to this point later in the text.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
While warehouse robotics, automated storage systems, and, to some extent, analytics have seen substantial progress in recent years, many of these tools still offer only marginal gains in system-wide performance. In fact, warehouse automation often fails to deliver a compelling ROI when viewed across the full lifecycle of the investment. I have written about this elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, there is one technology that \u2013 despite periods of hype and relative quiet \u2013 may yet prove transformational in logistics, and especially in spare parts logistics: additive manufacturing. Spare parts logistics is certainly among the most wasteful and least loved branches of logistics, so that\u2019s exactly where we\u2019d need a revolution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What Counts as a Revolution in Logistics?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Before we get carried away, let\u2019s answer an important question: What qualifies as a revolution in logistics?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It\u2019s easy to get excited about new technology. But most tools are incremental: they optimize within existing structures rather than altering the structure itself. They make something \u201cless bad\u201d rather than \u201ctruly good\u201d. True revolutions in logistics (and elsewhere) are rare. They tend to have some things in common:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- They produce radical change, step-change improvements in cost, speed or some other relevant aspect.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- They become widely adopted and penetrate or change infrastructure. They do not remain niche tools for specific applications.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- And frequently, they reshape business models, not just improve or tweak processes.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
By that standard, the list of real revolutions is short \u2013 but clear:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- Pallets (1920s): Pallets enabled unit-load handling and the mechanization (and subsequent automation) of warehousing. The standardization of load carriers led to an array of improvements and simplifications.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Shipping Containers (1956): Containers greatly facilitated and fueled global trade by enabling intermodal transport and slashing port times. You could say containers meant for global transportation what pallets meant for warehousing.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Barcode (1970s): Barcodes enabled automatic identification, drastically simplifying and improving storage, picking, quality control, performance measurement, and much more.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Lean Logistics (1980s\u201390s): Changed the mental model in logistics from push to pull, and prioritized cycle time over resource utilization.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
These innovations brought a new \u201coperating system\u201d into the industry. They didn\u2019t just<\/em> reduce cost or improve performance in some incremental way, they did not make something less bad<\/em>, they lead to dramatic improvements<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The question, then, is this: Could additive manufacturing be the next entry on that list? The waiting list for technologies to be added to the list of logistics revolutions is quite short. In fact, I believe additive manufacturing is the only<\/em> candidate that qualifies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What Happened to the \u201c3D Printing Revolution\u201d?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Additive manufacturing (AM), more widely known as 3D printing, refers to the process of creating objects by adding material layer by layer, following a digital design file. Unlike traditional subtractive manufacturing, where material is milled or cut away, AM deposits only what is needed. This not only reduces material waste but also enables the production of highly complex geometries that would be difficult or impossible to achieve using conventional methods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Around the early 2010s, the usual suspects (industry charlatans, career academics, and their cross-overs) touted additive manufacturing as a game-changing technology. It featured prominently on the Gartner Hype Cycle. Countless headlines proclaimed the imminent transformation of global supply networks, factories, and even end-user manufacturing (today it would probably be called \u201ccitizen manufacturing\u201d or so).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And then it got quiet. Media coverage waned, and the LinkedIn crowd with their \u201cthought leaders\u201d turned their attention to newer buzzwords like blockchain or the Metaverse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is important to mention that the Gartner Hype Cycle features lots of nonsense and shows very little predictive validity. It\u2019s great for \u201cjournalists\u201d to have something to talk about, though.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Absurdity of Today\u2019s Spare Parts Logistics<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Let\u2019s take a step back and look at how we currently manage spare parts logistics. And I want you to reflect for a moment on how absurd the system really is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We forecast spare parts demand \u2013 often poorly. The forecasts are frequently totally off because, well, predicting the future is not easy. Based on those forecasts, we produce millions of parts globally. We ship them across continents, then we store them in central warehouses, regional distribution centers, and often on-site at customer locations. They sit there for months, sometimes years, sometimes decades. Many of these parts are never used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And then? Eventually, they\u2019re scrapped. Often, they are outdated, replaced by newer versions, obsolete before they were ever needed. Sometimes, they hit their maximum shelf life or their quality deteriorates so much over time that they can\u2019t be used once they are needed. It is obvious why we do this. Spare parts usually need to be available the moment they are needed. We can\u2019t wait for weeks or months until a spare part that we need is manufactured from scratch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The rationale is understandable. Downtime can be costly, and no one wants to be the manager who didn’t order the right part. But the result is a massively inefficient system that consumes incredible amounts of working capital, occupies incredible amounts of storage space, contributes to CO\u2082 emissions \u2013 all without delivering value until (and unless) the part is used. The true cost of a spare part often lies not in its manufacturing, but in its lifetime of storage, handling, insurance, and eventual obsolescence (i.e., its system cost).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, frequently enough there arenot enoughspare parts available: forecasts can be wrong in both directions. You can produce too much or not enough. Owners of many older cars or older production equipment know this from experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The structural inefficiencies in spare parts logistics have remained largely unchanged for decades (or forever?). And this is where additive manufacturing offers, or rather: will offer, a credible alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A New Architecture of Spare Parts Logistics and Its Implications<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The promise of additive manufacturing is not just faster prototyping or lower tooling costs. These benefits are certainly nice to have. The game changer, however, is a different one: It\u2019s about shifting from physical inventory to digital inventory. Instead of producing and storing thousands of items, companies could maintain a library of certified 3D design files \u2013 ready to be printed on demand. Local production hubs or even on-site printers could manufacture parts within hours, rather than waiting days or weeks for international shipping or keeping items on stock for years just in case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Just think about the implications for a moment! They are profound:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- Inventory levels drop dramatically: you will keep mostly those items that are tiny and cheap, as well as those that you can\u2019t print. Especially high-value items would be printed only on demand when possible.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Warehousing requirements shrink as a direct consequence of the previous point. Less stuff means less space needed. And that\u2019s true not only for one warehouse, but for hundreds of thousands of large and small warehouses around the world.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Capital is freed up: Have you ever looked at a \u201crecommended spare parts package\u201d for an automated logistics system in total disbelief, realizing that you did not budget in those several hundred thousand Euros when getting the project approved?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Lead times shorten: if you need a spare part that you, or your spare parts supplier, did not stock, you can wait very long until you get a hold of that part. This problem will simply not exist any longer for many parts.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Transportation is reduced or eliminated: not only will parts not be produced, shipped and stocked based on forecasts. But if you don\u2019t have them on stock, it will not be necessary to fly them around the globe. I have heard several stories of people flying across continents to pick up important and urgently needed spare parts personally and transport them back, sometimes in their hand luggage.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Environmental impact decreases: clearly, all that waste related to spare parts logistics has an environmental aspect, too. The environmental impact is impossible to quantify in any serious way. It is safe to say, though, that it is huge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
None of this is far-fetched.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Oh, I forgot to mention one important consequence:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- Countless transportation and warehousing companies will go bust.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Without this last consequence, it wouldn\u2019t be a revolution. Lots of companies make good money with the production, sales, distribution and warehousing of spare parts. These companies play a very important role with today\u2019s architecture of spare parts logistics. And they exist because they are needed to perform all those process steps that will become partially or entirely redundant with additive manufacturing. Fig. 1 illustrates the difference between the archetypical process in spare parts logistics today \u2013 and in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.beer-management.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/image-6.png?resize=1024%2C225&ssl=1\")
Fig. 1: Current and Future Archetypical Spare Parts Logistics Process<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n Don\u2019t forget that the process chain shown is greatly simplified: the production to forecast, transportation and storage not only concerns finished spare parts, but all their components, too. The supply network is full of inventory that sits in warehouses and ties up capital. And: sure, you need raw material for additive manufacturing. Effort and complexity of making a low number of different types of raw material available to printers are a lot lower than for producing, transporting, and warehousing a variety of tens of thousands of spare parts and their components on the various levels of the supply network. It is a whole different game.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The process steps these companies perform today \u2013 circled in the orange dashed line \u2013 are non-value adding from the customer\u2019s perspective, but they are necessary to the extent they enable availability of the spare parts needed. They are necessary evils customers will pay for because there is no choice. However, if the availability of spare parts can be ensured without these process steps and the cost of this waste becomes apparent, there is no reason to believe that business will carry on as usual.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Lean, we distinguish between Type I Muda and Type II Muda. To Type I Muda, we count activities that do not add value from the customer\u2019s perspective, but are currently necessary under existing conditions. To Type II Muda, we count activities that add no value and are completely unnecessary. The process steps circled in the orange dashed line consists entirely of Type I Muda. (Much of logistics does). The most expensive and wasteful steps can be eliminated from the process with additive manufacturing. Designing for additive manufacturing, or converting the existing CAD model of the parts into a printable file is a comparatively small step for many parts. It\u2019s not nothing, though, and even designing for conventional logistics has certainly never become the default in design and engineering departments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Logistics service providers (3PLs or LSPs) are the industry most severely affected by the change. And yet, my impression is that many of them don\u2019t quite appreciate that this is going to happen. Let\u2019s be clear: This is going to happen. There is no \u201cif\u201d, only \u201cwhen\u201d. Since<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- we can<\/em> do additive manufacturing,<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- and for a broad<\/em> variety of parts,<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- and our capabilities will continue to improve,<\/em><\/li>\n\n\n\n
- and the cost<\/em> for additive manufacturing has come down<\/em> drastically (and will continue to do so \u2013 while cost for storage and transportation will continue to go the opposite direction),<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
I cannot imagine an alternative reality where this is not going to disrupt the business of spare parts logistics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I know of exactly one logistics service provider that in cooperation with an automotive OEM is exploring print centers for spare parts. I know of several more who have \u201ctalked about\u201d additive manufacturing\u201d (I\u2019m sure all of the big ones have talked about it), but have not come to any conclusions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Here is what I believe is going to happen: all notable logistics service providers in the business of spare parts will dip their toes in the water. They will have some innovation department that at some point concludes that \u201csomething has to be done\u201d. Then they go back to normal. Meanwhile, some newly founded industry outsider will go all in with a bold plan and show everybody else how it\u2019s done. By the time the established 3PLs realize what\u2019s happening that industry outsider will eat their lunch.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Someone is Going to Have Their Lunch<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Just in case this remind you of Tesla: yes, that\u2019s exactly what\u2019s going to happen. The German automotive OEMs had dipped their toes in the water of electric propulsion continuously since the 1990s. Audi had fully functional hybrid electric cars in the 1990 (battery reach: 50 km).[1]<\/a> Mercedes-Benz had a fully electric 190 model in 1990.[2]<\/a> The first Mercedes-Benz A-Class \u2013 that ugly thing that famously failed the \u201cMoose Test\u201d, corroded quicker than a 1970s french car parked in the dead sea, and overall was an insult to the brand name it carried \u2013 was engineered with electric propulsion in mind.[3]<\/a> For as long as I can remember, there have been test fleets of hydrogen-electric cars at Mercedes-Benz, perhaps most notably the B-Class F-Cell.[4]<\/a>[5]<\/a> None of this seems to have had any influence on the success, or the lack thereof, the German automotive OEMs had with electric cars. Tesla emerged out of nowhere and showed the world how to get this right, and how to kiss some of the most prestigious car makers in the world good-bye on their path to redundancy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This time around, it will not be the automotive OEMs, but a good number of 3PLs that will be disrupted by some company that currently probably doesn\u2019t even exist yet \u2013 in spite of many years of lead time. And while it is not clear when<\/em> this this going to happen, it is absolutely obvious that<\/em> this is going to happen. It might be in ten years, in twenty or in thirty \u2013 not a long time considering the impact we are talking about. And for those in need of spare parts, this will be the best news in a very long time!<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A Thousand Cuts and a Case in Point<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The change will not be sudden; the transition will take a while. Not only are we looking at hundreds of billions<\/em> of Euros worth of inventory that\u2019s already there, along with hundreds of millions of Euros worth of tools and equipment that are already there for the production of spare parts, but also at a well-oiled machinery of 3PLs offering their services and an army of dinosaurs in board rooms. And while there are technical barriers and limitations, I will say the predominant obstacle is a lack of strategy. Not everywhere, though,<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Today, additive manufacturing is often, and perhaps primarily, used for prototyping. Already some years ago, however, the Ford Motor Company started to print legacy spare parts for some of their classic cars \u2013 parts for which the right tools, and the staff to work them, often don\u2019t exist any longer.[6]<\/a> One of the most recent print centers at Ford is focused at parts to support the series production process[7]<\/a>, along with series production parts for low-volume vehicles.[8]<\/a> Generally, it seems like a good number of companies in the automotive industry are observing very closely, and experiment with, AM. I mentioned Ford already; BMW, too, shows strong interest in technology and application and operates an Additive Manufacturing Campus not far their HQ.[9]<\/a> Here, too, the production of components for production equipment, such as gripper elements, is emphasized,[10]<\/a> though some sources mention even series production parts (for car models with lower sales volume, though, like Rolls-Royce).[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The fact that the (otherwise failing) automotive industry embraces AM is not surprising. These companies may have lost their sense of taste and design (especially BMW), and accountants with no interest in cars whatsoever seem to have been dominating and oppressing the engineers for quite some time (especially at Mercedes-Benz and Audi). But they are pretty good at production, and anything related to production processes (much more than what<\/em> exactly they produce\u2026) constitutes heart and soul of these companies. It is no surprise, therefore, that car makers appreciate new production technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Moreover, they have a lot <\/em>of spare parts. A car consists of > 15.000 parts, many of which can break and need replacing. Many parts are modified mid life cycle, creating the need for even more parts and variants of parts. While some spare parts can later be sourced form third party manufacturers, some require the original OEM tools for production \u2013 and won\u2019t be produced any longer once a car model\u2019s production phases out. Many spare parts are stocked on forecast, which leads to either too much or not enough inventory, as explained earlier. This leaves car makers the choice between carrying costly inventory and disappointing their customers. For some components \u2013 electronic components in particular \u2013 there currently is no better solution. For many other types of parts, there is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is another domain to think about. Frankly, it is one of the last things I want to think about, but unfortunately the need for it does not seem to go away: the Military. Military operations involve critical equipment. Military operations require effective logistics to support and supply troops and their equipment. Logistics is not only mission critical, but also incredibly expensive. Reducing the reliance on spare parts storage and supply can make a huge difference, both to reliability of supply and its cost. In fact, the German army has been exploring AM technology for spare parts supply for some years.[12]<\/a> Of course, the US military is exploring the technology and its applications, too, including for legacy systems.[13]<\/a> [14]<\/a> The Pentagon seems to be taking this seriously. In a dedicated document titled simply Additive Manufacturing Strategy<\/em>[15]<\/a>, the U.S. Department of Defense outlines in very clear language a future in which AM becomes a core capability across maintenance, repair, and operational logistics. It emphasizes the need for (i.a.) decentralized production capabilities that allow parts to be manufactured close to the point of use \u2013 even, in \u201ccontested environments\u201d (i.e., in war zones). The underlying idea is straightforward: the current model of shipping parts halfway around the world from centralized depots is too slow, too vulnerable, and too expensive. AM will augment the logistics network where it sucks the most: legacy platforms, hard-to-source components, and field operations with minimal logistics support.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
War has always been a driver of technological innovation, and this one is highly likely to play a major role in the future. It would make a lot of sense. With extensive military use, technological advances usually trickle down to civilian applications over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Another industry that\u2019s beginning to take additive manufacturing seriously is the offshore oil and gas sector. These companies operate in remote, high-cost environments where logistics is always a constraint, but rarely an excuse. It\u2019s not like offshore platforms are floating around without backup: they are engineered with redundancy, especially for critical components. And of course, there are onshore warehouses, supply bases, specialized logistics companies, and entire logistics networks set up to support them. About a year ago, I interviewed the general manager of an offshore logistics company headquartered in Stavanger, Norway. He shared several interesting stories with me that illustrate just how insane the cost for just about anything offshore is. Importantly, almost any cost pales in comparison to the cost of lost production offshore. The incredible profitability of oil and gas companies provides little reason to \u201csave money\u201d with additive manufacturing. I wouldn\u2019t call cost considerations a non-issue; however, the drive behind developments in AM in that industry is probably driven by focus on uptime rather than cost. The updated NORSOK Z-008 standard[16]<\/a> explicitly recognizes additive manufacturing as a viable technology for spare parts supply. This is an industry where equipment often stays in operation for 30 or 40 years, and the original parts, tools, and suppliers may no longer exist. If you\u2019ve got the geometry, you\u2019ve got options. Reverse-engineering legacy parts and storing digital twins rather than physical stock may increasingly be the most practical way of ensuring continued production without interruption. And compared to conventional production, storage, and transportation, the economics might line up, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Let\u2019s talk a bit more about the economics of it\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cost, Cost, Cost: Unit Cost vs. System Cost<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
One of the most common arguments against additive manufacturing in spare parts logistics is that it’s too expensive. And in a sense, that’s true. If you take a part that used to be injection-molded in a low-cost country and compare it 1:1 with a 3D-printed equivalent \u2013 same geometry, same function \u2013 the printed version will almost always lose on price. The raw material is more expensive, the cycle time is longer, and the equipment cost per part is higher. On a spreadsheet that focuses only on unit cost, the decision is easy: stick with conventional manufacturing. But that\u2019s the wrong comparison.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The economic case for AM is not built on unit cost. It\u2019s built on system cost \u2013 a category most procurement departments are poorly equipped to assess. System cost includes not just what you pay to produce the part, but everything else that happens around it: warehousing, transportation, obsolescence, downtime, expedited shipping, customs delays, minimum order quantities, and the capital locked up in stock that might never move.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Let\u2019s take a simple example: say a plastic housing costs \u20ac3 if injection-molded, and \u20ac18 if printed. Sounds like a no-brainer. But what if you need the part only twice a year? What if the minimum order from your supplier is 1,000 units, with a lead time of six weeks? What if 950 of those units will sit in a warehouse for five years and then be scrapped? And what if a stockout results in a machine standing still for two days? Suddenly, the \u20ac3 part isn\u2019t so cheap anymore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Additive manufacturing doesn\u2019t try to win the race on cost per piece. It wins on cost per failure avoided and on cost per part actually used. These are system-level metrics, not unit-level ones. And yet, most organizations still optimize for the latter \u2013 predictably so, because that\u2019s how departments and their budgets, incentives, and performance metrics are set up. Show me the incentive system, and I will show you the outcome.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It gets worse when procurement is decoupled from operations. If the procurement team is measured on average purchase price and MOQ discounts, they will tend to favor bulk orders. But the warehousing team then has to deal with overstock. I have written about this elsewhere: the disconnect with other departments is a major problem in intralogistics. And operations takes the hit when the wrong part is in stock and the right one isn\u2019t. Everyone optimizes their local cost center, and the total cost to the business goes up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Additive manufacturing requires a different kind of thinking, at least if we want to be honest about the economic side of it. That shift is uncomfortable in organizations trained to believe that bigger batches and lower purchasing cost per unit mean better economics. But in spare parts logistics, especially for slow movers or late-life-cycle components, that logic simply doesn\u2019t hold. The goal is not to produce cheaply; the goal is to make sure the part is available when and where it\u2019s needed \u2013 without tying up capital in thousands of parts that might never be used. Low unit cost is not an end in itself, even if the VP of Production says so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Until companies understand and internalize this distinction, they will continue to reject additive manufacturing for being \u201ctoo expensive\u201d while quietly bleeding money in overstock and obsolete inventory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This Won\u2019t Work for Everything<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Additive manufacturing won\u2019t replace the entire spare parts supply system anytime soon, and pretending otherwise is unhelpful. There are still plenty of barriers that limit broader adoption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Start with certification and compliance. In sectors like aerospace, rail, or offshore energy, a part is not a part unless it has documentation, material traceability, and often third-party approval. Just because you can print a bracket doesn\u2019t mean you\u2019re allowed to use it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then there\u2019s materials and process limitations. Not every part can be printed to meet the mechanical, thermal, or chemical demands of the original. For example, long-span structural components or high-performance elastomers are still a problem \u2013 unless you\u2019re willing to redesign the entire assembly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
IP and cybersecurity are another concern. Companies are rightly worried about digital part files being tampered with, leaked, or used without control. Many OEMs still hesitate to release CAD files even to trusted partners, let alone third-party print vendors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And finally, there\u2019s cost \u2013 and mindset. In parts of the organization where success is measured by purchase price and MOQ discounts, printing a \u20ac25 part instead of ordering 1,000 units at \u20ac3 each looks like a failure. Changing that thinking takes time, and often requires different incentives entirely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That said, these are implementation challenges<\/em>, not structural flaws<\/em>. They delay the revolution but won\u2019t stop it. The economic case still holds \u2013 especially for low-volume, high-impact parts where conventional logistics is already inefficient. The conclusion remains: additive manufacturing doesn\u2019t work everywhere, but where it works, it makes the old way look absurd.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unforeseen Champions of AM<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
There\u2019s another case worth watching more closely: organizations operating in environments where intellectual property rights are only \u201cweakly enforced\u201d and funds are limited. In such settings (think of many companies across China, parts of Southeast Asia, or Africa) the incentive to buy original spare parts from the OEM, often at significant markup, is low. The incentive to reverse-engineer and 3D print a component that appears functionally equivalent, on the other hand, is high. Whether or not that part is certified, tested, or traceable in the way the OEM would require is often a secondary concern. What makes these cases so interesting is that one of the major obstacles to AM adoption \u2013 IP governance and rights management \u2013 is simply ignored. As a result, these organizations may act as \u201cnatural laboratories\u201d for studying how additive manufacturing is used when traditional compliance burdens are stripped away. They are unlikely to follow the rules, but they may get to the future faster.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Final Remarks and Conclusion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
It is exceedingly obvious that production is going to change. Perhaps not mass production of injection-molded small parts consumed in high volumes, at least not any time soon. With additive manufacturing being the alternative to production, transportation, storage, transportation again, storage again, and all of that based on forecast, spare parts logistics invites complete overhaul and disruption. As I said earlier, I cannot imagine an alternative reality where spare parts logistics will continue as it does today for the next couple of decades. The business model of companies relying on the old model of spare parts production, storage and distribution will be disrupted from the outside if they do not manage to disrupt themselves from the inside. Chances are the \u201cTesla of spare parts\u201d will embrace the change before incumbents do. The revolution in spare parts logistics will be unlike any of the revolutions in logistics before: whereas previous revolutionary change led to drastic improvements in the way we did things, this one will change the things we do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From a first-principles perspective, the entire concept of spare parts logistics rests on three assumptions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- \n
- Parts will fail.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- We won’t know exactly when or where.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Replacement parts need to be available faster than we can produce them.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
That\u2019s it. Everything else \u2013 forecasting models, central warehouses, regional distribution centers, buffer stocks, expedited shipping \u2013 is a solution layered on top of those three constraints.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But if we challenge the third assumption \u2013 that production is too slow to meet demand when it arises \u2013 then the entire structure becomes negotiable. Additive manufacturing doesn\u2019t change the fact that parts fail. It doesn\u2019t predict failures better. But it does change what\u2019s feasible in terms of responsiveness. If a part can be produced locally, on demand, and within acceptable lead times and tolerances, then the logic of stockpiling becomes optional rather than mandatory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From this angle, AM doesn\u2019t just reduce logistics complexity \u2013 it invalidates the need for it in certain scenarios. The problem isn\u2019t solved more efficiently; it\u2019s redefined to the point where the original solution no longer applies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I am simultaneously surprised and amazed by the fact that this change, that is so obviously going to happen, receives comparatively little attention both inside the industry and from academia. Sure, there is plenty of research on AM \u2013 but this happens mostly outside and independently of logistics departments. People are obsessed with robots for picking, transportation, storage, and the like \u2013 when these robots only make sense within the existing paradigm and processes that are being upended by additive manufacturing. There is a big difference between improving an existing process \u2013 and rendering it obsolete, especially if the old process can be largely characterized as wasteful by design (Type I Muda). Or to quote Michael Hammer: Don\u2019t automate, obliterate.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
The only question is not whether spare parts logistics will change \u2013 it\u2019s whether your company plans to be the one changing it, or the one being disrupted by it. You\u2019ll get maybe twenty more years to think about it, but not much longer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is going to be very<\/em> interesting to watch!<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n[1]<\/a> Audi AG, 2011. Audi duo. Audi Technology Portal. URL https:\/\/www.audi-technology-portal.de\/\/en\/mobility-for-the-future\/hybrid-vehicles\/audi-duo_en<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[2]<\/a> Schray, B., 2020. Pionier der E-Mobilit\u00e4t: Mercedes-Benz 190 mit Elektroantrieb im Jahr 1990. Automuseum Stuttgart. URL https:\/\/automuseum-stuttgart.de\/pionier-der-e-mobilitaet-mercedes-benz-190-mit-elektroantrieb-im-jahr-1990\/<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[3]<\/a>Mercedes-Benz A-Klasse, 2025. Wikipedia. Online: https:\/\/de.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Mercedes-Benz_A-Klasse<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-26).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[4]<\/a> Zwettler, M., 2021. 30 Jahre Brennstoffzelle bei Mercedes-Benz. Konstruktionspraxis.<\/a> Online: https:\/\/www.konstruktionspraxis.vogel.de\/30-jahre-brennstoffzelle-bei-mercedes-benz-a-1003201\/<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-26)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[5]<\/a>Mercedes-Benz F-Cell, 2025. Wikipedia. Online: https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Mercedes-Benz_F-Cell<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-26)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[6]<\/a> I was unable to find the official press again release that made this claim. I swear I read this press release some years ago \ud83d\ude09. It seems to have disappeared. [Note to students: \u201cI swear\u201d is not how you cite in your thesis].<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[7]<\/a> Ford Opens New 3D Printing Centre to Support Production of its First All-Electric Vehicle to be Built in Europe, 2023. Ford Media Center. URL https:\/\/media.ford.com\/content\/fordmedia\/feu\/en\/news\/2023\/02\/08\/ford-opens-new-3d-printing-centre-to-support-production-of-its-f.html<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[8]<\/a> Moore, S., 2019. Ford turns to additive manufacturing for replacement, niche parts. Plastics Today. URL https:\/\/www.plasticstoday.com\/3d-printing\/ford-turns-to-additive-manufacturing-for-replacement-niche-parts<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[9]<\/a> Additive Manufacturing Campus: Components Straight From the Printer, 2020. BMW Group. URL https:\/\/www.bmwgroup.com\/en\/news\/general\/2020\/additive-manufacturing.html<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[10]<\/a> BMW 3D printing takes over in production: individual robot grippers play a crucial role, 2024. . BMW Group. URL https:\/\/www.bmwgroup.com\/en\/news\/general\/2024\/production-with-3d-printing.html<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[11]<\/a> McMahon, M., Williams, N., 2024. BMW Group: Laying the foundations for the application of metal Additive Manufacturing in the automotive industry. Metal AM Magazine 10 (2). Online: https:\/\/www.metal-am.com\/articles\/bmw-group-laying-the-foundations-for-the-application-of-metal-additive-manufacturing-in-the-automotive-industry\/<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[12]<\/a> Atzberger, A., Montero, J., Schmidt, T., Bleckmann, M., Paetzold, K., 2018. Characteristics of a metal additive manufacturing process for the production of spare parts. Presented at the Symposium on Design for X, pp. 83\u201394.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[13]<\/a> Brading, T., 2020. 3D steel printing at forefront of modernization, readiness. Army News Service. URL https:\/\/www.army.mil\/article\/234017\/3d_steel_printing_at_forefront_of_modernization_readiness<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[14]<\/a> Customer Success Stories: United States Army, 2022. Markforged, Inc. URL https:\/\/markforged.com\/resources\/case-studies\/united-states-army<\/a> (last access: 2025-09-30).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[15]<\/a> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research & Engineering). \u201cDoD Additive Manufacturing Strategy.\u201d Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 2021. https:\/\/www.cto.mil\/dod-additive-manufacturing-strategy\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
[16]<\/a> NORSOK. NORSOK Z-008:2024: Risk Based Maintenance and Consequence Classification<\/em>. Standard Norge, December 20, 2024. https:\/\/online.standard.no\/nb\/norsok-z-008-2024<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
- and for a broad<\/em> variety of parts,<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- we can<\/em> do additive manufacturing,<\/li>\n\n\n\n
- Countless transportation and warehousing companies will go bust.<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n